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Saturday Afternoon Fever
by Michael Peter Waxman
National Collegiate Athletic Association
V.
The Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma and the University of Georgia
Athletic Association
(Docket No. 83-27 1)
Argued March 20, 1984
ISSUES
On fall Saturday afternoons, millions of Americans
turn their television sets on and watch one - and some-
times two - college football games. In this case, the
Supreme Court must tackle who selects the games that
will be broadcast and how they will be selected. Specifi-
cally, the Supreme Court will address whether the Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) may enter
an exclusive contract, on behalf of its member institu-
tions, with television networks and cablecasters.
The Board of Regents of the University of Okla-
homa and the University of Georgia Athletic Association
(Oklahoma and Georgia) represent two colleges with
highly successful and salable football programs. They
allege that the NCAA violated the antitrust laws by en-
tering exclusive television contracts which restrict the
number of games that may be broadcast in one season
and limit the number of appearances a member school's
team may make during the next two seasons. These
contracts are alleged to monopolize the college football
television market, restricting the fees member colleges
receive compared to broadcasters bidding on individual
games. Oklahoma and Georgia claim that the NCAA
polices the exclusive contracts with an illegal provision
requiring its members to boycott violators. Finally, Okla-
homa and Georgia indicate that small telecasters and
advertisers are harmed by their inability to participate in
showing the games.
By contrast, the NCAA asserts that televised Satur-
day afternoon college football already competes against
many diverse and significant programs. The NCAA
claims the football games clearly vie for consumer atten-
tion and television dollars in a marketplace in which it is
far from a monopolist. Further, the exclusive contracts
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are alleged to have clear procompetitive effects. (e.g.,
The exclusive contracts spread television exposure
among more teams, thus helping more schools attract
good players. It is also claimed that these contracts actu-
ally enhance a pecuniary and intangible benefit to the
members compared with a per game bidding system.)
Oklahoma and Georgia claim that the mere showing
that these restrictive and price-fixing contract provisions
existed constituted a conspiracy in violation of the anti-
trust laws. The NCAA argues that a court must weigh
the proof and extent of the procompetitive benefits
against any anticompetitive effects to determine
whether there has been an antitrust law violation.
FACTS
The NCAA is an unincorporated association of 785
public and private American colleges and universities.
The NCAA supervises athletic competitions between
and among member institutions under the rules pro-
mulgated by the NCAA with the approval of its mem-
bers. An NCAA bylaw entitled th "television plan"
permits it, as exclusive agent for its members, to enter
with national television broadcasters into exclusive con-
tracts for televising live college football. The NCAA
permits all other intercollegiate sports it regulates to be
televised without exclusivity restrictions. The NCAA
began its television plan in 1951.
Each exclusive contract with a television network
permits showing live college football games on a -net-
work package" basis. The network package gives the
national broadcaster the right to present a season long
block of games every Saturday afternoon but is subject
to certain restrictions relevant to this case:
1. The broadcaster has a set number of exposures (an
exposure is a time slot on the network for a national
or multiple regional games) per season;
2. Each NCAA member institution is limited to a maxi-
mum number of times it may appear on national or
regional telecasts in a two-year period (this is limited
through the NCAA's bylaws for member institutions);
3. The broadcaster is required to show a minimum
number of different teams during a two-year period;
4. Broadcasters and member institutions are restricted
to only limited "exception" telecasts that might com-
pete with the network or other live games. (The CFA
was an association of NCAA member institutions con-
sisting of five of seven major football playing confer-
ences and virtually all major football playing
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independent schools.)
Although the television plan has generally main-
tained its original format from 1953 to the present, it
was expanded in 1981 to permit more national television
broadcasters to participate. In addition, the rules and
penalties for violations were tightened.
In 1981, the College Football Association (CFA) at-
tempted to develop an independent television plan with
the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) while the
NCAA was negotiating its television plan with NBC's
competitors. The limited exception: Colleges generally
may telecast their games outside the network contracts
only if they are sold out or are more than 400 miles from
the visiting teams' campuses, and the telecasts would not
interfere with attendafice at any other game that is not
sold out. There are other exceptions for less prominent
football programs, including those that have not re-
cently been on network television. Telecasts of post-sea-
son bowl games also are outside the scope of the
television plan and networks' contracts. The NCAA
reacted by adopting an "official interpretation" to its
bylaws that: "[T]he [NCAA] shall control all forms of
televising of the intercollegiate football games of
member institutions during the traditional football sea-
son ..... ".In addition, the NCAA publicly threatened
CFA members with sanctions ranging from reprimand
to expulsion.
Since the NCAA announced that it would seek expe-
dited disciplinary action against offending schools, af-
fecting not only their football program but other sports
as well, the CFA filed a class action against the NCAA in
the United States District Court for the Western District
of Oklahoma. In that action, they sought to obtain in-
junctive relief from the limits on telecasting contained in
the television plan and the networks' contracts. Subse-
quently, the CFA application for classification was with-
drawn and the action was maintained by the Board of
Regents of the University of Oklahoma and the Univer-
sity of Georgia Athletic Association.
Oklahoma and Georgia argued in the district court
that the television plan and networks' contracts violated
the antitrust laws because: 1) the networks' practice of
offering equal payments for every game telecast nation-
ally or regionally was price fixing obtained with the
agreement and direction of the NCAA; 2) the NCAA
members refusal to telecast games other than in accord-
ance with the plan and contracts due to the threat impli-
cit in the NCAA's rule to expel members that violated
the television plan constituted a group boycott; 3) the
NCAA's exclusive representation of its member institu-
tions in conjunction with its rule against outside telecasts
constituted monopolization of live college football tele-
casts, and 4) that the television plan and networks' con-
tracts constituted unreasonable restraints on trade.
The district court agreed with Oklahoma and
Georgia on all issues and entered an injunction declar-
ing the television plan and the 1982-85 networks' con-
tracts void. It also barred the NCAA from making any
other contract of a similar kind in the future. The in-
junction also prohibited the NCAA from interfering
with member institutions' sale of television rights or
requiring any college to relinquish control of television
rights as a condition of membership. The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the district
court, but on different grounds. The appellate court
rejected the boycott holding and declined to consider
the monopolization holding of the district court.
Instead, the court of appeals concluded that the televi-
sion plan and networks' contracts violate the antitrust
laws because they reduce the number of games shown
on television. Member institutions that would like to
contract outside the network arrangements often cannot
do so. Thus, the contracts are an unreasonable restraint
on trade.
The court of appeals maintained the injunction but
restricted some of the district court's injunctive relief.
Instead of banning the NCAA from taking any role in
telecasting, the appellate court permitted the NCAA to
limit televising a college's games as a sanction for viola-
tion of other rules, to prohibit the telecasting on Friday
nights (when high schools play) and to develop less
restrictive plans that did not entail assertion of exclusive
rights to telecasting. The NCAA petitioned the United
States Supreme Court for review.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
The Supreme Court's decision in this case will be
extremely important not only to the parties, hut to other
collegiate members of the NCAA and the millions of
dedicated Saturday afternoon armchair quarterbacks.
The effect of the decision on antitrust law is far less
certain.
If the Court finds for Oklahoma and Georgia, there
will be an opportunity for colleges to negotiate indivi-
dually with national, regional and local broadcasters to
present their games. The starburst effect of these nego-
tiations could include: diversity of game selection for
viewers; greater opportunities for national, regional and
local advertisers, and live football exposure for more
colleges. Since hypothetically, the viewers would have
more games to choose from, the price of the television
contracts would reflect the size of each viewing audi-
ence. Advertisers unable or unwilling to pay for the
exclusive national broadcasts could be accommodated to
sell to smaller audiences. These prospects are greatly
enhanced by the growing web of national, regional and
local cable systems and the development of the "'mini-
cam."
The increase in televised college football games may
also have substantial negative effects. The colleges rich
with quality players and/or quality reputations will com-
mand the national spotlight. Since the national broad-
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casters would be free to have top ranked teams and
popular schools televised every week, national coverage
of lesser teams may dwindle. This might mean less op-
portunity for these schools to attract current high school
players from other regions. Most significantly, any of
the exclusive contract dollars trickling down to the other
colleges would probably dry up.
If the Court finds for the NCAA, member colleges
will remain bound to the exclusive contracts until they
vote to change it or to leave the association.
Because Oklahoma and Georgia raised a potpourri
of antitrust issues, it is difficult to prognosticate the legal
significance of a decision in this case. The difficulty is
revealed and compounded by the differing antitrust law
analyses, findings of violations and remedies in the dis-
trict and appellate courts. The Court must first deter-
mine whether the football games are in a separate
market than other events televised on Saturday af-
ternoon (as the district court found). Next, the Court
may decide whether the NCAA's share of the market
(however market is defined) and the exclusivity restric-
tions which maintain that market share constitute mono-
polization or an attempted monopolization of that
market. In lieu of a monopolization analysis (a monopo-
lization analysis was made and supported by the district
court but avoided by the appellate court), the Supreme
Court may decide that the restrictions of the television
plan are an unreasonable restraint of trade (as found by
the appellate court). The Court could even revive Okla-
homa and Georgia's argument that the NCAA's enforce-
ment mechanism which requires its members to boycott
violators constitutes a group boycott in violation of anti-
trust laws. Although the parties did not directly argue
this issue to the Supreme Court, the district court found
a group boycott and the appellate court rejected it. In-
deed, any or all of these analyses are possible.
The legal issue with the greatest potential signifi-
cance is whether the mere existence of the restrictive
contract provisions in conjunction with the provisions
which appear to fix the price paid by the television
broadcasters as agreed to by the NCAA constitutes a
violation of the antitrust laws. This analysis has been a
tradition of the antitrust laws for price fixing cases vir-
tually since the passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act of
1890. If the NCAA convinces the Court to weigh the
proof and extent of procompetitive benefits against anti-
competitive effects (referred to as the -'rule of reason"
approach), this case will become a landmark decision. It
will dramatically change the evidentiary standard and
burden of proof in price fixing cases. Because it is unli-
kely the Court will reverse this precedent, NCAA suc-
cess on this issue would be a home run, goal and
touchdown rolled into one opinion.
ARGUMENTS
For National Collegiate Athletic Association
1. An agreement among universities to establish televi-
sion packages for football may not be held unlawful
on its face because it reduces the number of different
games shown on television when there exists signifi-
cant procompetitive features.
2. To avoid application of the per se rule the defendant
in an antitrust case only need prove the existence and
extent of procompetitive benefits and not the "neces-
sity" of the contractual arrangements.
3. College football television programming on Saturday
afternoons is not a separate market for antitrust pur-
poses.
4. A process of competitive bidding ending in the letting
of contracts for the telecasting of college football
should not be treated as a suppression of competition
because, once the contracts have been signed, there is
no further rivalry game-by-game for broadcast rights.
For Oklahoma and Georgia
1. An agreement among virtually all producers of com-
mercially salable intercollegiate football to sell foot-
ball television rights exclusively through a common
sales agency may be held unlawful on its face when it
eliminates price competition, restricts output, fore-
closes small telecasters and advertisers from the mar-
ket and restrains trade more than reasonably
necessary to promote the efficiencies of the integra-
tion.
2. An antitrust defendant may not obtain a rule of rea-
son analysis for otherwise illegal restraints by assert-
ing that such restraints are ancillary to other
purported goals, irrespective of the actual impact of
the restraints on competition, iithout showing the
alleged goals are procompetitive or that the restraints
are reasonably necessary to attain such goals, and in
the face of factual findings that the restraints do not
further the goals.
3. The district court's finding, affirmed by the court of
appeals, that NCAA has sufficient market power to
produce anticompetitive effects through its controls
over its members' football television rights is not
clearly erroneous.
4. A combination by virtually every producer of com-
mercially salable intercollegiate football to sell broad-
cast rights only as a package, on an exclusive basis, to
a limited number of buyers, and restricting the rum-
ber of games sold, should be treated as a suppression
of competition although the package is sold by a
process of competitive bidding.
AMICUS BRIEFS
An amicus brief in support of the National Collegiate
Athletic Associationwas filed by the National Federation
of State High School Associations. Supporting Okla-
homa and Georgia were the United States of America
and the Association of Independent Television Stations,
Inc.
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